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(District of New Jersey D.C. 01-cv-04183) - page 25 / 30





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management of the overall trust is meant to be a conflict-free endeavor. An insurer such as HN-NJ, however, owes distinct duties to each of its customers, including various benefit plans and other entities. Even while acting as a loyal fiduciary to the beneficiaries of one plan, HN-NJ must be mindful of the duties it owes to the beneficiaries of other customer plans, all of whom are paid from the same pool of assets. Again, we see that HN- NJ and the Health Net companies have interests larger and distinct from those of its beneficiaries.

Finally, we note that HN-NJ and its parent companies paid for legal advice using their own assets, not those of their beneficiaries. Courts have noted that when a trustee pays counsel out of trust funds, rather than out of its own pocket, the payment scheme is strongly indicative of the beneficiaries’ status as the true clients. E.g., Riggs, 355 A.2d at 712 (“[T]he payment to the law firm out of the trust assets is a significant factor, not only in weighing ultimately whether the beneficiaries ought to have access to the document, but also it is in itself a strong indication of precisely who the real clients were.”). Conversely, when a fiduciary obtains legal advice using its own funds, the payment scheme is an indicator (albeit only an indicator) that the fiduciary is the client, not a representative.

Together, these four factors – unity of ownership and management, conflicting interests regarding profits, conflicting fiduciary obligations, and payment of counsel with the fiduciary’s own funds – indicate that an insurer which sells insurance contracts to ERISA-regulated benefit plans is itself the sole and direct client of counsel retained by the insurer, not the mere representative of client-beneficiaries, and not a joint client


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