its leadership and to orchestrate a common response. To implement this response the US was assisted by some, but not all, members of the EU. Whether it would be willing to undertake such action in the case of disruptions further to the east is not at all certain.
Europe is not the only regional commitment of the United States. US forces have been deployed to conflicts in Asia, the Middle East and Central America. Perceived by all to be the sole super- or global-power, or in the words of the French foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine “hyper power,” the US has had, since the end of the Second World War, obligations and national interests that have gone far beyond those of the nations of the EU. As the EU progresses in its integration scheme and seeks to develop security objectives to match its less parochial economic objectives, the question of the complementary or conflictual relationship with those of the US must be raised. In the Transatlantic Agenda of 1995 the US and the EU have agreed to cooperate on security issues in the Middle East and in Korea. The extent of actual EU involvement in time of crisis will only be ascertained in the event and the forging of common objectives that will engage most or all EU members may prove more difficult in actuality than it has on paper. James A. Thomson argues that “unless Europe moves decisively to counteract the growing perception in the United States of its unwillingness to help the United States outside of Europe, there will probably never be another NATO operation like the one in Bosnia.xxix More fundamentally, is the willingness of the EU members to allocate the resources required for it to play a military role that is commensurate with its economic role. This would require a very substantial increase in revenues, increased taxes and/or reduced expenditures, that it is not unreasonable to doubt EU citizens will be willing to make. Thus the most probable forecast is that the EU will continue to be a “free rider,” at least in the eyes of the US government, when it comes to global strategic and military affairs.
John Peterson uses the example of the establishment of the “Eurocorps” to illustrate the complexities of forming a unified EU position of security issues. President Mitterand and Chancellor Kohl proposed in 1992 that the existing French-German brigade be expanded to a force of up to 40.000 troops, in part through incorporation of forces from other EU member states. Spain and Belgium argued that this violated what was agreed at Maastricht. The Netherlands and the UK declined to participate on the assertion that this step would undermine NATO. The US complained that it was not consulted and that it was suggested during a rethinking of NATO strategy. He concludes that “the challenge for USA-EU relations became the search for compromise within a myriad of national agendas.”xxx
4d2. – The north-south Atlantic Rim relations have not been the sort that would support the development of closer ties throughout the region. Britain had its war with Argentina over the Falklands in the 1980’s and the US has had an active engagement in Central America that has been sordid at best. The local conflicts in Africa have attracted the military attention primarily of France, but the humanitarian disasters of, among others, Rwanda and the Congo, have brought non-military assistance from many nations in North America and the EU. However when France proposed intervention in Rwanda, basing that action on humanitarian needs, no other EU member supported that action. One British scholar has written that: “Deploying forces overseas retains overtones of (the) colonial