ended the contradictions between the economics and politics of welfare but transformed their forms of appearance.
Given these various sources of crisis-tendency, it is hardly surprising that, from the early 1980s onwards, at different times and speeds, in different fields in different societies, the KWNS state has been subject to several changes which tend to produce a new welfare regime. This can be described as a 'Schumpeterian Workfare Postnational Regime' (hereafter SWPR) and can be contrasted with the KWNS in four respects. First, the SWPR is Schumpeterian in so far as it tries to promote permanent innovation and flexibility innovation in open economies by intervening on the supply-side and to strengthen as far as possible the structural competitiveness of the relevant economic spaces. Second, regarding social reproduction, the SWPR can be described (infelicitously and at the risk of misunderstanding) as a workfare regime in so far as it subordinates social policy to the demands of labour market flexibility and structural competitiveness. Such 'workfarist' subordination of social to economic policy is most likely to occur where these policies concern the present and future working population. It is for this reason that education has such a key role in 'workfare' strategy. More generally, 'workfare' in the present meaning of the term is also associated with downward pressure on public spending -- for this is now regarded mainly as a cost of international production rather than as a source of domestic demand. Third, regarding the national form, the SWPR can be described as 'postnational' in so far as the increased significance of other spatial scales and horizons of action has made the national territory less important as a 'power container'vii. This does not mean the end of the national state but signifies rather the 'relativization of scale' as compared to the primacy of the national level during the Atlantic Fordist period (see above). And, fourth, in using 'regime' rather than state to describe the SWPR, I wish to emphasize the increased importance of non-state delivery mechanisms in providing any state-sponsored economic and social policies. In addition to the role of public-private partnerships oriented to capitalist economic growth and workfare, we can also include the renewed interest in the 'social economy' under this rubric (see below).
The rise of the entrepreneurial city
So far I have discussed the crisis-tendencies in the KWNS at the level of the national state. But these interrelated crisis-tendencies have also had their own distinctive effects at the international level (as evidenced in crises of the principal postwar international regimes) and at the sub-national level (as evidenced, for example, in the crisis of the Fordist form of city). More generally, there is a complex, multi-dimensional crisis of cities as forms of socio-economic, civil, and political organization. And this has prompted debates over new ways to manage cities and deal with their many and varied problems. Problems rooted in uneven economic development within and across nations and a more general fisco-financial crisis affecting all governments are central issues in this regard. They have encouraged new forms of inter-urban competition for access to resources as well as the search for an (endogenous) urban growth dynamic which could compensate for limited public resources. In addition, the crisis-tendencies affecting the economic and political capacities of national states have made cities and their hinterlands more significant as nodes and vectors in organizing economic, political, and social life than they were during the period of Atlantic Fordism. This has expanded the economic and political space for cities and regions to engage in competition and has highlighted the importance of cities' differential capacities to reflect on and secure the conditions for economic dynamism (cf. Storper 1997). Finally, shifts in the modalities of competition in an increasingly 'globally integrated' but still multi-scalar, unevenly developing, and tangled economy have modified the nature of inter-urban as well as international competition.
Overall, this is reflected in the rise of so-called 'entrepreneurial cities'. The distinctive feature of such cities is their function of -- or, at least, their declared self-image as proactively engaged in -- promoting the capacities of their respective economic spaces in the face of intensified competition in the global economy. In this regard, cities have a key role in the tendential development of the Schumpeterian workfare postnational regime. For, whether entrepreneurial or not, they have become key sites and stakes in the struggle to redefine the boundaries of the state and its role in securing the conditions for the valorization of capital and the reproduction of labour-power. This may explain why cities now seem to be replacing firms as the new 'national champions' in international competition. They are becoming sites of struggle over economic and social restructuring to enhance competitiveness (even at the expense of social polarization and deepening social exclusion). And they are becoming the political basis for new forms of growth or grant coalition and new forms of social alliance -- sometimes including the old and new social movements, sometimes marginalizing them. At the same time national states find it harder to contain the activities of some cities (those which have been integrated into a network of global cities