The ASLB’s analysis is fatally flawed. The only valid basis for the NRC’s claim to be able to exclude some “generic” issues from NEPA review license renewal proceedings is that it has already addressed those issues in the programmatic GEIS for license renewal. The 1996 GEIS did not address the risks of sabotage or terrorism in any respect. In fact, it has been the longstanding policy of the Commission to refuse to address the impacts of sabotage or terrorism in its EIS’s. See Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-819, 22 NRC 681, 697-701 (1985) (“ALAB-819”), review declined, CLI-86-5, 23 NRC 125 (1986), aff’d sub nom. Limerick Ecology Action Inc. v. NRC, 869 F.2d 719, 744 (3d Cir. 1989).4 Thus, the mere fact that the threat of terrorism and sabotage is common to all operating reactors does not excuse the NRC from addressing it in this individual NEPA license renewal review. The ASLB had no legal basis whatsoever for refusing to accept any aspect of the sabotage and terrorism contention on the ground that it is “generic” in nature.
It is also worth noting that the ASLB had no factual basis for concluding that the issues raised by NIRS were common to all nuclear facilities. While some aspects of the risk of sabotage or a terrorist attack may be general in nature, an analysis of the risk necessarily will involve the vulnerabilities of each particular plant, depending on its design and location.
C.The Commission Must Take Into Account New Information and
Changed Circumstances Showing That the Threat of Terrorism and
Sabotage is Foreseeable.
In LBP-02-04, the ASLB also rejected a portion of NIRS’s contention on the ground that it does not provide “new information” on environmental impacts. In particular, the ASLB ruled that “any information relating to the location of the McGuire units in the approach to the
4 The fallacy of this policy is discussed at length in CCAM/CAM’s Brief in Response to CLI-02-05.