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the threat of terrorism and sabotage just because a number couldn’t be attached to its likelihood.  See Final Rule, Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants, 59 Fed. Reg. 38,889 (August 1, 1994).5   

Other terrorist events during recent years, which were previously discounted by the NRC as unworthy of consideration in its environmental reviews, must now be re-examined in light of the September 11 attack.  Taken together, they highlight a number of significant factors:  the vulnerability of U.S. facilities and institutions, the sophistication of the attackers, and the persistence of efforts to damage major U.S. government facilities and other institutions.  These events include the 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut; the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center; the February 1993 intrusion into the Three Mile Island site, in which the intruder crashed his station wagon through the security gate and rammed it under a partly opened door in the turbine building; the 1995 bombing of a federal building in Oklahoma City; the plot to bomb the United Nations Building, FBI offices in New York City, the Lincoln Tunnel, the Holland Tunnel, and the George Washington Bridge;  the 1998 bombing of the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya; and the 2000 bombing of the U.S.S. Cole.  

Moreover, these incidents show that the impacts of terrorist attacks can be severe, even devastating.  The potential consequences of such attacks, should they cause containment breach or loss of water to spent fuel pools, are devastating.  Thus, there can be no doubt that the new understanding of the potential for acts of sabotage and terrorism against nuclear facilities constitutes new information that could have a significant effect on the nature of environmental impacts caused by the operation of the facility, and that could affect the types of alternatives and

5   For a more complete discussion of the relevance to NEPA of the Commission’s factual determinations and treatment of risk, see CCAM/CAM’s Brief to the Commission in Response to CLI-01-05, Sections III.C and D.

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