the consideration of intentional malevolent acts in this proceeding. NIRS agrees with the arguments made in CCAM/CAM’s brief. Rather than repeating the arguments here, NIRS refers the Commission to the discussion in CCAM/CAM’s brief.
The Commission now has before it four cases which raise the same question: does the Commission have any justification for continuing to refuse to prepare EIS’s that consider the impacts of radiological sabotage and terrorism against nuclear facilities? The only rational answer is “no.” The increasing number of lethal terrorist attacks over the past ten years, culminating in the tragic attacks of September 11 on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, have provided overwhelming evidence that malevolent and highly destructive acts against U.S. facilities are credible and must be taken seriously. Protecting nuclear facilities against terrorist attacks has been an overriding preoccupation of the NRC since September 11, and continues today. Just two days ago, for example, the NRC issued an order to all nuclear power plant licensees, requiring them to take immediate, specific measures to protect against “the generalized high-level threat environment.” EA-02-026, Order Modifying Licenses (Effective Immediately) (February 25, 2002). Under the circumstances, to continue to deny that terrorist and sabotage attacks are foreseeable would defy reason.
Preparation of an EIS will provide the real benefit of identifying reasonable alternatives and mitigative measures for reducing the likelihood and/or impacts of malevolent acts of terrorism and sabotage against the Catawba and McGuire plants. This is especially important in light of the fact that the U.S. Department of Energy (“DOE”) has identified McGuire and Catawba as plants that will utilize MOX fuel made from weapons-grade plutonium. No U.S. nuclear reactor has ever used MOX fuel before (particularly derived from nuclear warhead material), and thus a thorough investigation of impacts and alternatives is particularly important.