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Nothing came of these early intentions, for the evacuation of Boston by the British and the seizure of Crown Point and Ticonderoga by the Americans changed the shape of the war before any of the commander-in-chief's plans could be put into operation. Instead, for the first year or more of the war in the northern theatre, the nature and degree of Indian participation was determined by Guy Carleton, the governor of Quebec. Unlike Gage, Carleton had small confi- dence in the military effectiveness of the Indians, he believed that their use would be impolitic and he had a profound dislike for their manner of warfare. Before the commencement of hostilities Gage had asked him to raise Indian forces as well as units of the Canadian militia. Though Carleton was enthusiasti- cally in favour of raising Canadian battalions (and was to be sorely disappointed) he was distinctly tepid with respect to the Indians, merely assuring Gage that the Canada Indians and their neighbours were available for service "whenever you are pleased to call upon them, and what you recommend shall be complied with". 8

That Carleton wished to place severe limits upon the use made of Indians emerged clearly in July 1775 when a council involving a number of Indian na- tions was held at Montreal. There he laid down that only small bodies of Indians would be used to gather intelligence, that British officers would always accom- pany them and that they were to be confined operationally within the province of Quebec "as he did not think it prudent to let them go beyond the 45th deg. of Lat: or over the Province Line".9 Initially he justified this policy to Dartmouth on the ground that Indians were "not to be depended upon, especially by those who are in a weakly situation", adding that neither the Indians nor the Canadians were as formidable as they had been in 1759, except "in Idea". 10 Some weeks later he offered a further explanation that had moral and probably political im- plications. "I would not even suffer a savage to pass the frontier, though often urged to let them loose on the rebel provinces", he wrote to Dartmouth, "lest cruelties might have been committed and for fear the innocent might have suf- fered with the guilty". 11

As a result of this policy few Indians served with Carleton's small forces during the American invasion of Canada and their subsequent withdrawal. Yet one of the most notable small successes of this campaign was won by a party of Indians operating with a detachment of the 8th Regiment when in May 1776, a force of Americans was defeated at the Cedars, on the St. Lawrence above Montreal, and several hundred prisoners were taken. So thoroughly imbued were Carleton's subordinates with the principles he had set down to govern the use of Indian auxiliaries that the officers commanding the regular detachment paroled all the American prisoners rather than risk an unfortunate incident. He explained his conduct as follows:

After the maturest deliberation of the Customs and Manners of the savages in War, which I find so opposite and contrary to the Humane disposition of

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