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veyed the following proposal on the withdrawal of her troops from China.

"Of the Japanese troops sent to China during the China Inci- dent, those in designated sections of North China and Inner Mongolia, and those on Hainan Island, will remain for a nec- essary period of time after the establishment of peace between Japan and China. The remainder of the troops will begin with- drawal simultaneously with the establishment of peace in ac- cordance with arrangements to be made between Japan and China, and the withdrawal will be completed within two years." 1

However, the Secretary of State Cordell Hull presented a 10 point program to Japan on 26 November, 1941. Points 3 and 4 of this 'Hull Note' called for the evacuation of China and French Indochina, and for the support of the Chunking regime and the abandonment of the Nanking regime. In spite of Secretary Hull's "too hard and rigid policy" to Japan,2 we can find another utterance in the Army and Government of the United States. For instance, "Stilwell's Mission to China" says as follows.

"The thought behind aid to China was to keep the Japanese fully occupied there beginning in the last six months of 1941." 3

And on 7 April, 1941, Dr. Stanley Hornbeck, 'the adviser on political relations in the State Department', hinted as follows:

"It is the belief of the undersigned that so long as and while Japan remains a member of the tripartite alliance, it would not be in the interest of the United States or in the interest of Great Britain that the Japanese-Chinese hostilities be brought to an end by any process which leaves Japan's military machine un- defeated (undiscredited) and intact. ….The world situation be- ing what it is, the world conflict and its problems being what they are, Japan's present involvement in China is to the advan- tage of the United States and Great Britain,...." 4

I think these thoughts are inconsistent with Secretary Hull's "moralistic and legalistic approach"5 to Japan. Therefore I cannot recognize that the China problem is the most serious matter in the confrontation between Japan and the United States.

Japan's advance southward

The Southeast Asian question is more important than the China problem as

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