as a step towards the acquisition of western material and civil advantages. Fur- thermore, in the British Empire many regarded imperial rule as a training for self-government, that is to say as political development.
Passive voluntary acceptance of imperial rule has been questioned. Indian nationalists now assume the Mutiny to have been the commencement of the struggle for liberation rather than a last gasp of pre-conquest opposition.24 The degree of African acquiescence has also been challenged by T.O. Ranger who discerned continuity of opposition from the time of conquest to the time of lib- eration.25 But Indian historians who wrote centennial histories of the Mutiny have rejected the theory that it was primarily a nationalist rising;26 and early re- sistance movements in Africa and elsewhere were local, rather than national. Nationalism everywhere stemmed from Western ideology rather than from in- digenous sources. Nationalist elites became militant and organized political re- sistance to military dependence only when they became impatient with the slow rate of political development. National movements of resistance were possible only because western imperialism had radically changed the nature of African society, turning tribesmen into what might be called a peasant class. 27
Hence, the prime feature of the imperial-colonial relationship in the British Empire was a military dependence that was at first acceptable to large sections of the colonial populations and had both costs and benefits. It was not economic dependence and explitation as the dependency theorists have assumed. Further- more, no matter how dependent a colonial possession became, decision-making was never completely taken out of the area.28 This was certainly the case in the British Empire, if only because economic and financial considerations kept lo- cally raised or locally supported forces at a minimum. 29
Military dependence obtained in all kinds of colonies; but colonies of set- tlement with responsible government had a greater say in the nature, and there- fore on the consequences, of their dependence. Among them Canada was unique by virtue of its proximity to the United States. Canada has been dependent from the beginning of pioneer settlement to its present status as an advanced industrial power. In the seventeenth century the French settlement on the St. Lawrence were so vulnerable to Iroquois raids that the one-thousand-strong Carignan- Salières regiment of regular soldiers had to be sent from France to defend a col- ony that numbered only a few thousand settlers, Later New France got a perma- nent garrison of Troupes de la Marine, raised especially for service in America. Paid by the crown, troops incidentally gave a great fillip to the economy of the thinly populated colony.
In the nineteenth century British sea power was so effective that only one power, the United States, could attack Canada directly. But against that particu- lar power naval protection could be given only by indirect preventive retaliation, except on the vital Great Lakes. There the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1818 had