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Continental powers.38 In 1899 Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain, British soldiers in Canada, and English-speaking Canadian imperialists maneuvered Laurier into offering Britain aid against the Boers.39 A little later, proposals to build a Canadian Navy in lieu of financing dreadnaughts for the Royal Navy to meet the German naval challenge were a factor in Laurier's defeat in 1911.40 Nevertheless, Canada entered the European war in 1914 on the principle "when Britain is at war Canada is at war," but demanded, and obtained, military auton- omy.

Canada's war effort won international recognition at the peace conferences and in the League of Nations on equal terms with sovereign states;41 and the Statute of Westminster in 1931 recognized Canadian independence although the word was not yet respectable. Canadians regarded the enormous cost of World War I as a price they had paid for a military dependence that was no longer nec- essary now that the United States no longer threatened.42 In the 1920's perhaps because of a continuing colonial mentality and objection to defence centraliza- tion, Canada again failed to accept responsibility for maintaining military forces appropriate to its new independent status.43 Canada seemed to be a "fire-proof house far from combustible material. "44 The consequences were a continuing weakness, and therefore continuing military dependence.

Participation in World War II was a voluntary decision that led to the rais- ing of a considerable military force and a great war effort. Again Canada insisted on military autonomy. At the end of the war Canada was the fourth military land and air power in the world (not including China), and the third sea power. But that position could not have been maintained when war-torn nations revived; and it was not what Canadians wanted.

Accordingly, as a result of the cold war and intercontinental ballistic mis- siles that made North America vulnerable, Canada once again became militarily dependent, this time on the United States. This had been forecast as long ago as 1904 by Sir Wilfrid Laurier when he told a startled British GOC of the Militia that Canada was protected by the Monroe Doctrine.45 Canadian cooperation with the United States was designed to protect the deterrent power of the U.S. Strate- gic Air Command and so to reduce the possibility of a nuclear war in which Canada would be within target areas even if neutral. There was a sound realiza- tion that Canada would in the future only fight in a major war as an ally of the United States. This switch of voluntary dependence on Britain to dependence on the United States was marked by adoption of more readily available American weapons and training facilities.46 The high cost of modern weapons had made it even less possible for Canada to develop its own supplies, for instance in air- craft, sophisticated warning systems, and defence missiles. So for that reason, and because of geography, Canada was even more dependent on the United States than previously on Britain.47 The Arms Production-sharing Agreement still further consolidated the integration of Canadian-American defence. But

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