many Canadians believed that military dependence brought an immoral in- volvement in the Vietnam war which they had thus far avoided.
How far did this new military dependence restrict Canada's independence? Nationalists complained about infringements of Canadian sovereignty, for in- stance as a result of the presence of American forces on Canadian soil; and an American radical who had taken up residence and had become a Canadian citi- zen inveighed against the "Partnership with Behemoth." His charge was that Canada was, or was on the way to become, an American satellite.48 On the other hand, because the United States was more bound in her own interests to offer Canada protection, the latter could afford to be rather less subservient to Ameri- can wishes than many other "client" states. Canada sent troops to Korea, but her leaders became increasingly disenchanted with American motives and sought, though in vain, to ensure that the war was a United Nations' police action. Unlike Australians and New Zealanders, Canadians did not serve in Viet Nam. But Canadian nationalists accused the government of subservience to the United States in its China policy. However, Mr. Trudeau recognized Peking a few months before Nixon went there. Canada's contributions to United Nations and other peacekeeping ventures were efforts to demonstrate a degree of independent initiative in foreign and defence policy. The Third Option in Canadian foreign policy, and the readjustment of defence policy to stress the protection of Cana- dian sovereignty by assuming the role of surveillance over all Canadian territory, are all examples of the way in which Canada, though a military dependent, could display independence. 49 50
Canada's experience of continued military dependence after political inde- pendence has been repeated by other new nations. Since the Second World War, about seventy colonies have followed Canada's path to independence, peacefully or violently, but always more precipitously. These new nations often want tech- nical arms, navies, and air forces more for prestige than for utility. But they are usually weak and often they have greater, and not less, need for security forces and protection than colonies.51 Some have resisted the temptation to build large armies, others have not. Since the most sophisticated arms have to be obtained from advanced powers, new states that have large forces are in consequence made even more dependent than those that have restrained their appetite.
Today in place of colonies, protectorates, and spheres of influence there are mutual security agreements, and multi-lateral and bi-lateral defence treaties. In place of garrisons and native levées, there are military advisors for independ- ent indigenous armies. Instead of obsolescent arms supplied free-of-charge there are arms sales, loans, grants and economic aid for military purposes. Instead of pay for native soldiers there is defence support, budget support, and economic aid, The real difference from the age of -imperialism is that whereas colonies had no choice but to be dependent on the winner of the last imperial war, the new weak states can now choose, within certain limits, the power on which they wish