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ferred to the New World. Why has it taken two additional centuries for super- power professionals to understand that black pajamas and hunting shirts have a different "victory" and "survival" capacity; that they are not necessarily awed, but rather challenged by "thin red lines", "smart bombs" and war direction from absentee landlords in eighteenth century London, Paris, Madrid or twentieth century Washington, Peking, and Moscow? It appears to this observer that pro- fessional soldiers and statesmen then and now prepare to fight the wrong war in the wrong place at the wrong time based upon the carefully learned lessons of the war immediately past!

While war and defense were the most important "professional" roles for soldiers and sailors in the New World, they were not twenty-four hour jobs. This fact permitted all kinds of alternate and supplemental employment. Accordingly, we should batter down the barriers of regular/militia models perpetrated upon us for so long by traditionalist military historians. Militia as much as regular con- tributed in the non-combat sense. We really must steal a chapter from the "gos- pel" according to the United States Army. This institution accords a "One Army" concept to regulars, reserves, and National Guard - at least in principle. Since the average colonial was closer to being Janus-like in his multi-uniform "transves- tism" than most citizenry today, we can gain a better quantitative/qualitative focus upon the centrality of colonial military affairs by ending regular/militia segregation in our studies. 5

"The Man on Horseback" Concept

The renowned Anglo-American fear of the uniformed man on horseback imposing a Cromwellian style of rule upon the body politic, has undoubtedly hampered liberal scholarship in the past from full appreciation of the role of sol- diers in the colonies. It may be simply that history books have failed to clarify the fact that Spaniards like Juan Ponce de Leon, Panfilo de Narvaez or Alvar Cabaca de Vaca were "military men" of the period. Don Quixote-like, these characters flowed naturally from the dissolution of the ageold Christian-Moorish battles for the Iberian peninsula. They were part of a generation of unemployed men-in-arms, broken to the life of camp and field who simply could not adjust to tapestried chambers of peacetime. The New World beckoned to this breed of restless Spaniard whose ruthless, domineering, valiant, and shrewd personalities served Holy Mother Church and the Spanish Crown for conquest of technologi- cally inferior people from the Andes to beyond the Rio Grande. 6

Such a society spawned not only the conquistadores, but also later com- mandants-general who combined full civil, judicial, and military powers to ad- minister the far reaches of empire. We know of some - Colonel Juan de Texeda at Havana, as well as Brigadier (later Field Marshall) Don Teodroe de Caballero and Brigadier Jacobo Ugarte y Loyola - but we lack some appreciation of the impact of the man as mid-level administrator. This strong role of the Spanish

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