Younger scholars have recently begun to dissect these royal offi- cer/governors and have shown that many were elite Guardsmen with family background, London social position, the right political beliefs, and court lobby- ing techniques which gave them "one-upmanship" at securing the colonial posts. But, what of the provincial equivalents? Do we yet understand how military ser- vice in King William's War or King George's War for example helped the social, political status of aspiring Americans in the colonies? Was a gadfly of the local gentry like George Washington an aberration in his ability to turn part-time sol- diering into local influence, if not affluence? Or was he simply the most visible of a whole profiled local militia captains whose political, social, and economic fortunes turned on service for the Crown in the West Indies or before Louis- bourg?
Noncombat Contributions and Societal Implications
As we delve more deeply into military institutions and their surrounding societies, a whole new scene emerges for us. The spectrum of affairs in the His- panic tierra de guerra should excite greater attention - racially mixed garrisons under the exigencies of combat, creole-peninsulare class antagonisms transferred from civil to military societies, inabilities of European style warriors to over- come the native Apaches and Comanches, as well as the centrality of corruption and logistics as life style. Since the presidios and garrisons formed part of a fron- tier defense matrix, one wonders about a sense of continuum in civil-military integration which transcends the centuries separating Roman legions in Gaul and the Spanish in northern Mexico. 9
Even more stimulating is analysis of what seemingly was a "militarized" French Canada. On the one side we can find la milice in all its spirited independ- ence reflecting the working class les habitants from whence it sprang. Perfectly happy to confound French regulars like the Marquis de Montcalm, this strata apparently embraced the transplanted metropolitan haute classe attitudes of no- blesse oblige and clasped the popular Troupes de la Marine to its bosom. 10 Was it the daily presence of violence and death in colonial Canadian society? Or was it that the Troupes offered a sociological safety valve whereby successive gen- erations after the "first settlers" could rise via that military institution to the rank of colonial elite? The Conquest obviously spared French Canada any participa- tion in the French Revolution with attendant problems for aristocratic military institutions. But, may we speculate that the Quebecois remain some mutation of frustrated Gallicism from the colonial period, which never had the exhilarating experience of participating in revolution like their neighbors to the south, or brethren in continental Europe?
As for Anglo-America, the quest of younger generations today involves less intellectual curiosity about abiding issues of military history, and more con-