Riots at various places had already failed, but the party leaders still planned to capture cities. That Mao's actions were against the party headquarters' intention is proved by the fact that he was deprived of his candidature for the party's Central Political Bureau and nomination to the Human Province Commit- tee. At that time Mao planned to survive, taking shelter at Chingkangshan.
Mao explained that in a semi-colonial situation like that of China, where imperialism governed directly through military cliques at various places, weak red regimes could exist, as wars continued among white regimes.12 Chingkang- shan is located on the border of Hunan Province and Kiangsi Province. It ex- tends about 150 kilometers north and south and about 55 kilometers east and west and is a thinly populated mountainous area. It offered an ideal haven for the defeated troops driven back by the Kuomintang army. In fact, a group of about 600 bandits led by Wang Tso had already occupied the area in defiance of the authorities.
In the declaration of the foundation of the "Hsiang-Chiang PingLun" of July 1919, Mao stated that "every regime must be overthrown for the liberation of mankind". But he rejected "violent revolution" and instead advocated a blood- less revolution, carrying out a continuous "propaganda campaign" to persons in power through "union of the masses".
In 1926, in the "Analysis of All Classes of Chinese Farmers and Their At- titude toward Their Revolution"13 and the "Analysis of All Classes in Chinese Society;"14 he analyzed that of the then population of 400 million, 395 million were for a revolution, and that the main force of about 190 million farmers be- longed to a semi-owner-farmer, poor farmer and agricultural proletarian class. He further stated that "the problem of farmers is a central problem of a national revolution" at the beginning of the "National Revolution and Farmers' Move- ments". 15
"Revolution by the strength of a union of the masses" Mao conceived about 1919 emerged as "a revolution with the strength of a farmers' union as the main force" in 1926. But at that time, it seems he had no intention of armed struggle.
In a "Report of Inspection of the Hunan Farmers’ Movements" published in the 191st issue of the Hsiangtao of March 1927, he stated that "a revolution is a riot. It is a violent action wherein one class overthrows another class" and rec- ognized the fact that "landowners' armed power was overthrown and that farm- ers" armed power was established" as a result.
At this stage, Mao's view clearly shifted fron "a bloodless revolution" to "a violent revolution". Those were the days of the Kuomintang-Communist Party