so that it could exist, develop, and finally accomplish the duty of liberation. Some of its characteristics are as follows:
Unification of the party, the army and the government
It is said that in the "Sanwan reorganization", Mao organized committees, party cells and cell squads in the army, and established the party's guidance sys- tem for the army. In the "decision of the second convention of representatives of all districts of Hunan and Kiangsi province border" of October 1928 and the "report to the central headquarters of the Chingkangshan anti-enemy commit- tee", the party and the army are dealt with separately. But in view of passages in these literatures such as "the army's party will aid development of local parties", "expect aid of talented activists from the Red Army", and "when Mao's unit was moved to Hunan, the province border was abandoned for over one month", it appears that although ideologically, the organizations supervised by Mao in the Chingkangshan period were the party, the army and the administrative organ, actually these were united as an organization of the Red Army. Probably this was a reasonable measure for Mao, who considered that the revolution had en- tered the stage of an armed struggle.
And in order for Mao, who had been expelled from the party headquarters, to establish his leadership in the Chiangkangshan district, it was not desirable to separate the army from the party. In addition, under the circumstances where war was waged usually, it was inefficient to separate party affairs, military affairs and political affairs from one another, and moreover, there were not enough tal- ented people to carry this into practice. In order for Mao, a party man, to con- tinue an armed struggle fron an isolated mountainous base, it was an inevitable measure to unite the functions of the party, the army and the government with the Red Army. But there was the danger that if the party broke up, the army, too, would break up.
Three Duties of the Army
At the Kutien conference in December 1929, Mao made clear that he would charge the Red Army with the three duties of war, political operations and production. It was a natural consequence for the army that had united with the party to be assigned the duty of political operations. And the Chingkangshan district with a population of about 2,000 had not enough productive power to support the Red Army of about 1,400 persons.17 Moreover, in order to construct its base, the local people's confidence and support had to be obtained, and it was important to avoid incurring the opposition of the people exploiting their poor production.
Thus these three duties were indispensable tasks far the Red Army in those days. But, for the army to be burdened with the three duties would retard its ef-