Cole as an example of how hard it is to defend against these asymmetric attacks the
author argues that despite all this progress, “US capabilities to defend itself against
terrorism, and to preempt or respond to attacks, remain inchoate and unfocused.”43
He goes on to argue, while specifically speaking about counterterrorism, that an
effective policy, “is not a question of more attention, bigger budgets and increased staff.
Rather, it requires greater focus, a better appreciation of the problem and understanding
of the threat, and, in turn, the development of a clear, cohesive strategy”44 The problem
is that DoD’s strategy is essentially unchanged. This unchanged strategy is complicated
by the fact that, while some steps have been taken organizationally at the strategic,
operational, and tactical levels, the preponderance of its post Cold War strategic
organizational structure is unchanged in the face of these new threats.
1Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University & The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc., “Finding and Recommendation # 9,” Final Report on Strategic Responsiveness, Early and Continuous Joint Effectiveness – Across the Spectrum, April 2000, 6.
3Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United States of America 1997, Washington DC, Government Printing Office, December 1999. 26.
4Department of Defense, DoD Chemical and Biological Defense Program Annual Report to Congress, March 2000, 5.
5Gail Kaufman, Inside Defense.com, 3 October 2000, “Cohen Stresses The Need For Homeland Defense,” 3 October 2000, http://ebird.dtic.mil.
6Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University & The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc., “Finding and Recommendation # 9,” Final Report on