planning and preparing for future conflicts.”12 This conclusion makes the necessity for
strategic level integration and interagency coordination even more apparent.
While DoD spends a great deal more money on the WMD threat, it has not
followed suit with the sizable organizational changes necessary in today’s environment.
If the current combating terrorism and WMD 11 billion dollar figure is accurate,
DOD managed to tuck it into what is effectively its Cold War structure. Each of the
services still spends roughly the same share of the defense pie they did in the 1980s.
Other than comparatively minor shifts in responsibility, the unified CINCs are also
essentially unchanged. Only recently has DoD begun to change some of its organization
structure and procedures related to WMD defense, although many of these changes were
congressionally mandated not proactively pursued. Perhaps the first example of this was
the fiscal year 1994 Defense Appropriation Act (Public Law 103-160) directing DoD to
jointly develop and procure all NBC defense systems instead of conducting those
functions by individual service. Another was the Defense Against WMD Act (Public
Law 104-201) which initially designated DoD as the lead agency for domestic
preparedness against WMD and directed it to train 120 of America’s cities on WMD
As a result, DoD has changed some of its organizational structure to implement
and assist in these initiatives. New offices and organizations such as the ASD-CS,
DTRA, JTF-CS, and CBIRF reflect some of these changes. However, these coerced