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planning and preparing for future conflicts.”12 This conclusion makes the necessity for

strategic level integration and interagency coordination even more apparent.

Conclusion Seven

While DoD spends a great deal more money on the WMD threat, it has not

followed suit with the sizable organizational changes necessary in today’s environment.

Supporting Discussion

If the current combating terrorism and WMD 11 billion dollar figure is accurate,

DOD managed to tuck it into what is effectively its Cold War structure. Each of the

services still spends roughly the same share of the defense pie they did in the 1980s.

Other than comparatively minor shifts in responsibility, the unified CINCs are also

essentially unchanged. Only recently has DoD begun to change some of its organization

structure and procedures related to WMD defense, although many of these changes were

congressionally mandated not proactively pursued. Perhaps the first example of this was

the fiscal year 1994 Defense Appropriation Act (Public Law 103-160) directing DoD to

jointly develop and procure all NBC defense systems instead of conducting those

functions by individual service. Another was the Defense Against WMD Act (Public

Law 104-201) which initially designated DoD as the lead agency for domestic

preparedness against WMD and directed it to train 120 of America’s cities on WMD


As a result, DoD has changed some of its organizational structure to implement

and assist in these initiatives. New offices and organizations such as the ASD-CS,

DTRA, JTF-CS, and CBIRF reflect some of these changes. However, these coerced


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