X hits on this document

203 views

0 shares

0 downloads

0 comments

85 / 95

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

While chapter 5 determined that DoD is not adequately organized at the strategic

level to address the evolving WMD threat, this chapter summarizes why that is so. It also

suggests what may be done to address the problem.

Conclusions generated by recent national security panels and commissions

highlighted that domestic and international terrorism, as well as delivery of WMD by an

adversary through asymmetric means, are primary threats to the nation and its vital

interests. And, the cumulative effect of this conclusion appears to be shaping strategy

and mission reviews such as the upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Many

strategists determined that DoD must focus on other things. Consider this statement from

the Fletcher Conference:

The next QDR must match resources with mission requirements. In the resource allocation process, many Cold War defense systems that are no longer needed must be discarded. For instance, the need to invest and acquire counterproliferation capabilities for missions ranging from missile defense to consequence management are now greater than ever given that WMD use is among the most likely threats to the United States and its forces abroad. 1

The pre-QDR groups were mostly composed of credible and experienced national

security specialists at the highest levels from both within the government and in the

private sector. Most overwhelmingly see WMD as a primary threat. There is also widely

published evidence that DoD is currently structured to address these threats with

considerable operational and tactical force structure and expertise. However, DoD’s

organizational structure at the strategic level lacks the breath and depth required to fully

integrate all of its WMD assets towards a common focus. In addition, the other federal

74

Document info
Document views203
Page views205
Page last viewedFri Dec 02 23:15:34 UTC 2016
Pages95
Paragraphs2013
Words21971

Comments