with overall responsibility for Upper Iowa’s academic program, and that person should not be burdened with management of non-curricular aspects of the residential, extended or international campus. At the same time, faculty should be compensated for ongoing participation in the planning process.
Too, the subcommittee itself needs to be largely expanded to include representative faculty from each academic division as well as from the extended and international components of the university.
Finally, Upper Iowa University has a history of defining and implementing new majors based on short term marketing and athletics recruiting goals, and then eliminating those majors during the next enrollment contraction period, or letting them atrophy during periods of economic stress. This history suggests a nimble curriculum, but a remarkably unstable one. For example, the 1977 university catalogue identifies 27 majors serviced by a full time faculty of 49, for a ratio of 1.81 faculty members per major. Ten years later, 30 faculty were responsible for just 16 majors (1.88). By 1997, there were again 27 majors listed in the catalogue, but 18 of them—two thirds—were new since 1977, and all 27 were serviced by a full time faculty which still numbered 30, for a ratio of 1.11 faculty members per major. The 2007 Residential University catalogue lists a whopping 35 majors, 14 of which were not available as recently as 1997 (and only eight of which had persisted from 1977), and 35 full time faculty members; the faculty-to-major ratio had dropped to 1.00. Strategic planning should continue to foster the university’s ability to react quickly to market demands, but there is little that is “strategic” about reinventing oneself every time the wind changes. The planning process must support and enhance those major programs which are the university’s foundation and upon which its stability depends; it is, after all, stability which determines credibility.