Timothy R. Johnson and Jason M. Roberts
Ideological Distance between Nominee and Filibuster Pivot
Ideological Distance between Court Median and Filibuster Pivot
Ideological Distance between President and Filibuster Pivot
Presidential Approval at time of Nomination
Years Remaining in Office For President
Year of Nomination
Natural Log of Time Between Nomination and Senate Action
Generalized Event Count Regression Model of a President’s Public Invocation of Political Resources
Log-Likelihood Number of Cases
Coefficient (Standard Error)
a A significant gamma indicates that the model is overdispersed.
= p < .10.
presidents make to support their nominees ranges from a low of 1.43 to a high of 6.16 as the distance increases between the nominee and pivotal Senator. In other words, presidents who nominate someone who is ideologically distant from the Senate are almost five times as likely to go public to fight for their chosen nominee. Similarly, the predicted number of public statements varies from 2.34 to 6.45 as the distance between the current Court median and the pivotal Senator increases from its lowest to highest observed value. Thus, presidents invoke almost three times as many public statements when their nominee will not move the Court median ideologically closer to the pivotal Senator. Finally, the predicted number of public statements varies from a low of 2.16 to a high of 4.76 as the distance between the president and the pivotal Senator moves from its minimum to its maximum value.
Instances of specific behavior by presidents further buttress the empirical results presented in Table 2. Most of these accounts demonstrate that the use of