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meaning different from that accorded

were

made.

Id.

The

Court

concluded

it before the changes that the legislature's

reason for enacting Section 88.012 was to disapproval of prior constructions of the URESA.

evince its

Reading the

word llsupportlin subsequent sections of the URESA in pari materia with section 88.012 emphasized that the term llsupport'n means only "child support.

On petition for discretionary review, this Court accepted the reasoning in H e l m i c k and quashed the Quigley decision. S t a t e ex r e l . Q u i g l e y v. Quigley, 463 So. 2d 224 (Fla. 1985) The Court acknowledged the logic of the Second District Court's reasoning, but it did not see that the legislature intended by the amendment in 1979 to exclude orders of alimony support from the scope of Florida's URESA. 4 3 6 So. 2d at 226. The Court stated: -

If the legislature had meant to distinguish between child support and alimony, it should have redefined this term, especially in light of the previous application of URESA to alimony awards.

We cannot find that the statement of legislative intent impliedly meant to repeal alimony support actions previously available under URESA.

463 So. 2d at 226. The Court rejected the District Court's interpretation of the

in Quigley indicated that the legislature had to redefine "Support" if it wanted to limit the applicability of URESA to

7

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