maxims and so on (see e.g. Goffmann, 1997: Ch. 13, and Austin, 1975: 50-51). This would also include all knowledge about the world which is shared, or presumed to be shared, by participants in any given interaction. Van Dijk (2003) points out that, if we want to see what is considered ‘common sense’/shared knowledge in a text (which is typically the case with commonly accepted ideologies), we have to look at what is presupposed, since what is new knowledge has to be explicitly asserted and spelled out for the recipient. Rather than presupposition, Wodak uses the term allusions for the cases in which stereotypical beliefs are not spelt out but rather alluded to in discourse (2007) – the audience is presupposed to be familiar with the stereotypes and know what is being talked about. In cognitive linguistic terms we would say that words can trigger cognitive models, or frames, that is mental representations of the entities referred to, including related entities and evaluations (thus, a stereotype is a kind of cognitive model) – ‘knowledge of [frames] is presupposed for the concepts encoded by words’ (Fillmore and Atkins, 1990: 75, my emphasis).
As ideology operates on all levels of discourse, I look for ideological mental representations/frames triggered on word level, on sentence level and also on the level of the structure of the whole texts, where the presuppositions arise from the pragmatics of the speech acts performed and the generic structure of the texts3. I also look at whether and what knowledge is represented as ‘given’ or ‘contested/contestable’. At the same time, it is interesting to see that assertions made through declarative sentences, and directive speech acts (like advice and permission), are not only used to convey neutral ‘new information’, but also have pragmatic functions within a matrix of ideological shared knowledge.
Two of the three texts analysed below are clearly ‘advice-providing’ texts. ΒΑΛΕ ΛΑΔΙ ΚΙ ΕΛΑ ΒΡΑΔΥ (PUT ON OIL AND COME IN THE EVENING) by Playboy has the form of a step-by-step guide of how the male reader can give his female partner a sensual massage (‘oil’ refers to massage oil), and Q+A by Status has the well-known ‘agony aunt’ format, with questions about fashion and appearance presumably posted to the magazine by readers, and answers provided by an ‘expert’. The third text, entitled Ο ΔΙΚΗΓΟΡΟΣ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΒΟΛΟΥ- ΠΟΣΟ ΓΚΕΪ ΜΟΙΑΖΟΥΝ ΟΙ ΜΟΝΤΕΡΝΟΙ ΑΝΤΡΕΣ; (THE DEVIL’S ADVOCATE- HOW GAY DO MODERN MEN SEEM?) by Nitro is a hybrid between ‘advice’ and ‘commentary’ – it is not clearly or directly providing advice, but through commenting on men it indirectly guides men on ‘how not to seem gay’. In the analysis I am focusing on selected examples rather than an exhaustive list.
3.1 ΒΑΛΕ ΛΑΔΙ ΚΙ ΕΛΑ ΒΡΑΔΥ
PUT ON OIL AND COME IN THE EVENING
(Playboy, Feb. 2006, pp 136-137)
3 In the analysis I use the terms frames/cognitive models/socio-cognitive representations, stereotypes, beliefs, knowledge, perceptions, conceptualisations, conceptual metaphors (metaphorical frames) etc. without strictly drawing theoretical distinctions among them. My focus here is not so much the precise cognitive structure of these elements (interrelated in cognition and constituting clusters we may call ‘ideologies’ or ‘knowledge’), but rather the fact that, despite the mutual influence cognition and society have on each other, beliefs, stereotypes etc. do not necessarily represent the reality of the social world accurately – they do, nevertheless, constitute the basis of reasoning and action for members of society, legitimating sexist and discriminatory practices.