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Analysis of intelligence support to - page 23 / 27





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i Intelligence Officer, S-2, of Task Force 118 from May 1988 through July of 1988.

ii Commander, Alpha Company, 319th Military Intelligence Battalion (Operations) (Airborne) from July 1990 to July 1991.

iii For example, the XVIII Airborne Corps had a number of reciprocal intelligence exchanges with the French Sixth Armored Division (Light) and the French Foreign Legion.  The author had the opportunity to observe and participate in these productive intelligence exchanges on a daily basis.

iv Department of Defense Report to Congress, Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict:  Final Report to Congress, (Washington, D.C.:  U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1992), 14-1.

v While the highest levels of the United States Government may have been surprised by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, U.S. Central Command and its Component Commands were observing Iraqi preparations for offensive operations prior to its subsequent invasion of Kuwait.

vi These communications capabilities are commonly referred to today as “reachback” communications.

vii The NMIST Teams, today called NIST Teams, played an integral part in every post Gulf War U.S. military operation and continue to provide intelligence support today.

viii Today DIA and NSA typically merge their respective capabilities into one team.

ix The Army Intelligence Agency initiative to provide tactical commanders with detailed enemy templates and annotated imagery was but one fine example of national level support to the tactical force; these high quality products were well received and enormously helpful to battle staffs at all operational levels.

x The United States military was organized, trained and equipped to fight on the plains of Europe, not Southwest Asia.  The force lacked Arab linguists and soldiers well versed in Arab history, geography, culture and religion.

xi Saddam Hussein was painfully aware of the U.S. National Technical Means capability; particularly with regard to SIGINT and IMINT.

xii Walter S. Mossberg, “U.S. Intelligence Agencies Triumphed in Gulf War despite Some Weak Spots,”  The Wall Street Journal, 18 March 1991, sec A, p. 10.

xiii These ad hoc CI site surveys paved the way for emerging CI doctrine, ultimately producing today’s extremely professional Threat Vulnerability Assessments (TVAs).

xiv Charles J. Quilter II,  U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990 – 1991, (Washington, D.C.:  Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1993), 18.

xv Since Vietnam, the majority of U.S. military operations were conducted in places such as El Salvador, Grenada and Panama where it was able to leverage its tremendous population of native Spanish linguists.  Iraq presented U.S. intelligence linguist with exceptional challenges.

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