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xvi Soldiers routinely carried packs in excess of 150 pounds.  Soldier loads were excessive to due the large amount of water which had to be carried into battle.

xvii This was a critical issue, particularly during OPERATION DESERT SHIELD, when units were hunkered down in a defense inside northern Saudi Arabia waiting to cross the line of departure.

xviii Dominic J. Caraccilo, The Ready Brigade of the 82d Airborne in Desert Storm, (Jefferson, North Carolina:  McFarland and Company, 1993), 114.

xix Mossberg, 10.

xx The Army Security Agency was exclusively chartered with SIGINT operations in support of tactical and operational commanders.

xxi The U.S. Army fielded a number of tactical SIGINT collection platforms as well as fielding an analytical organization known as the Technical Control and Analysis Element (TCAE).

xxii Dragonfix, a High Frequency Direction Finding Electronic Support Measures system, was tested by C/519th Military Intelligence Battalion (Tactical Exploitation) (Airborne).

xxiii QRC became increasingly important through the 1990s as the SIGINT community essentially went deaf because it could not exploit emerging technologies such as cellular phones and the internet.

xxiv Richard J. Quirk III, Intelligence For The Division:  A G2 Perspective, An Individual Study Project (Carlisle Barracks:  U.S. Army War College, 8 July 1992), 307.

xxv Paul Richter and Tracy Wilkinson, “Turning Facts Into Attacks,” The Los Angeles Times, 6 April 1991, p.4.

xxvi While national imagery products greatly enhance operational planning, the time lag from request to delivery is often long.

xxvii Richter, 3.

xxviii Ibid., 4.

xxix The fledgling Hunter UAV program was field tested during the Gulf War.

xxx  LandSat is a commercial imaging capability which is more appropriate for mapping.  Furthermore, LandSat does not have a secure downlink.

xxxi The JSTARS program dated back to 1982 as a joint venture between the U.S. Army and the U.S. Air Force.  The system was not originally planned to be fielded until the mid 1990s.

xxxii Richter, 1.

xxxiii Department of Defense, 14-3.

xxxiv The air campaign and subsequent ground war kicked off during the “shamal” season in which visibility was extremely limited due to high winds and sandstorms.

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