xxxv BDA analysis was not taught at DoD imagery analysis courses prior to the Gulf War.
xxxvi The challenges confronting intelligence analysts was further compounded by the fact that analysts at all levels commonly disagreed over enemy composition, strength and disposition.
xxxvii Currently called the National Joint Military Intelligence Center.
xxxviii The DoD JIC was located in the Pentagon’s National Military Intelligence Center and the OICC was located in the Defense Intelligence Agency Center at Bolling Air Force Base, Washington, D.C.
xxxix In the wake of the Gulf War, JICs stood up at all nine of the Combatant Commands.
xl U.S. News & World Report, , (New York: Times Books, Inc., 1992), 321.
xli Although in its program infancy and not yet fielded during OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/STORM, the U.S. Army’s All Source Analysis System was fielded following the Gulf War.
xlii While this discussion is centered on the role of intelligence analysts, it must be noted that terrain analysts proved themselves equally noteworthy during OPERATION DESERT STORM. The terrain assessments produced by U.S. Army Engineers were critical planning tools during the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) staff planning process.
xliii Richter, 3.
xliv The collection versus TPED debate still rages today in the resource war of the Pentagon.
xlv Automated exploitation capabilities such as Automatic Target Recognition (ATR) and communications networks such as the Joint WorldWide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) were developed in the wake of the Gulf War.