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Cournot’s model of oligopoly - page 29 / 38

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Note: in no equilibrium is there any fight

Note: there is an equilibrium in which either player concedes first, regardless of the sizes of the valuations.

Note: equilibria are asymmetric, even when v1 = v2, in which case the game is symmetric.

E.g. could be a stable social norm that the current owner of the object concedes immediately; or that the challenger does so.

Single population case: only symmetric equilibria are relevant,

and there are none!

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