purpose of prostitution”; or “[b]y promises, threats, violence, or by any device or scheme, causes, induces, persuades or encourages another person to become a prostitute.” (Italics added.) Procurement encompasses a broad range of conduct, including the solicitation of a former prostitute to reenter the profession; it is not necessary that the victim ever actually perform acts of prostitution. (People v. Deloach (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 323, 333 (Deloach).) “The commission of any one of the acts described . . . constitutes the offense of pandering.” (People v. Charles (1963) 218 Cal.App.2d 812, 816 (Charles), citing People v. Montgomery (1949) 47 Cal.App.2d 1, 23-24 (Montgomery), disapproved on another ground in People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 454, fn. 2 [Dillon disapproved on still another ground in People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1185].) “The subdivisions of the . . . statute do not state different offenses but merely define the different circumstances under which the crime of pandering may be committed.” (People v. Lax (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 481, 486 (Lax).)
Sections 266h and 266i are closely related. Both are “designed to discourage prostitution by discouraging persons other than the prostitute from augmenting and expanding a prostitute’s operation, or increasing the supply of available prostitutes.” (Hashimoto, supra, 54 Cal.App.3d at p. 867; see also Deloach, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at p. 333.)
We first address the question of whether, as defendant maintains, Q. and D. were accomplices such that their testimony required corroboration.