assists in the exploitation of another woman is in the same position as the exploiter,” a woman “who permits herself to be criminally exploited is not in the same relation to the crime and does not approach it from the same direction as the exploiter.” (See also Frey, supra, 228 Cal.App.2d at pp. 51-52; People v. Pangelina (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 414, 422.) D. was charged with the same crimes as defendant, but she did not approach them from the same position. It is true that D. sometimes drove other prostitutes to hotels where they worked together, but this does not appear to have been accomplice activity within the meaning of sections 1111 and 266h. There was no evidence that D. recruited other girls into defendant’s ring or solicited for their prostitution; she did not post their photographs, phone numbers, or prices on the Internet; and she did not profit from their work.
Moreover, even when the witness may be considered an accomplice, the amount and nature of evidence required to corroborate her testimony is “‘slight.’” (People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 562-563.) “It is sufficient when the evidence offered as corroborative tends to connect a defendant with the commission of the crime in such a way as reasonably may satisfy a jury that the accomplice is telling the truth. It is not necessary that the accomplice be corroborated as to every fact to which he testifies. If his testimony could be completely proven by other evidence, there would be no occasion to offer him as a witness.” (People v. Trujillo (1948) 32 Cal.2d 105, 111.)
Q. and D.’s testimony about how defendant procured them for the purpose of prostitution and derived support from their work was amply corroborated by H., Staton,