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to re-enter the profession and a defendant who solicits one whom he believes presently to be a prostitute to change her business relations.”  (Bradshaw, at p. 426.)  Hashimoto and Patton, as well as a number of other cases, followed the rule of Bradshaw.  (See, e.g., People v. Jeffers (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 840, 855 (Jeffers); Deloach, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at p. 333.)

Like Lax and Charles, Hashimoto quoted, with approval, the purpose of the antipandering statute as stated in Montgomery:  “to ‘cover all the various ramifications of the social evil of pandering and include them all in the definition of the crime, with a view of effectively combating the evil sought to be condemned.’”  (Hashimoto, supra, 54 Cal.App.3d at p. 866; see also Lax, supra, at p. 487; Charles, supra, at p. 816.)

The Hashimoto court also cited Aguilera v. Superior Court (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 848 (Aguilera).  There, the appellate court found that “it is not stretching the logic of the wording, considering the broad purpose of the entire code section . . .” to construe language prohibiting a person from encouraging another to remain an “‘inmate’” of a “‘house of prostitution,’” to also refer to a maitre d’s encouraging a prostitute to use her apartment for prostitution.  (Aguilera, supra, at p. 852.)  A number of other cases where courts of this state deflected attempts by panderers to weasel out of their convictions by straining at particular words or phrases within subsections of the statute can be traced through Aguilera and authorities it cites.  (See, e.g., People v. Martin (1964) 228 Cal.App.2d 677, 680 [the word “‘procure’” does not include an element of compulsion and “‘house of prostitution’” can be an apartment]; People v. Nasworthy

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