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(1949) 94 Cal.App.2d 85, 91 [a taxicab can be a house of prostitution]; People v. Slater (1898) 119 Cal. 620, 622 [a single room occupied by a single woman can be a house of prostitution].)  

In Patton, this court reviewed Bradshaw and Hashimoto in detail and concurred fully with the rule of the two earlier cases.  In so doing, we rejected the exact argument now accepted in Wagner:  that because of the use of the word “become,” a prostitute cannot be pandered.  (Patton, supra, 63 Cal.App.3d at pp. 215-218.)  “The fallacy involved in this reasoning,” we said, “is the assumption that the Legislature was concerned only with actual, rather than potential, harm.”  (Patton, at p. 218.)  Like the two earlier cases, we quoted the purpose of the law as stated in Montgomery, noting in addition that although the language of the pandering statute “proscribes conduct in the nature of an attempt[,] . . . the relevant social policy question is the potential for harm which defendant’s conduct reveals.”  (Patton, at p. 218.)  The act of encouraging even “an established prostitute to alter her business relations . . . indicates a present willingness to actively promote the social evil of prostitution.”  (Ibid.)

Conceptually, we see another problem with reasoning that narrowly interprets the phrase “become a prostitute” as meaning to change one’s state of being.  This somewhat old-fashioned notion,6 seems to ignore the fact that to “be” a prostitute necessarily involves “engaging in” the prohibited criminal activity.  “[C]ourts are [not] always

(  Perhaps based on ideas of women’s status as “innocent” as opposed to “experienced” or “virtuous” in contrast to “fallen.”  (See Patton, supra, 63 Cal.App.3d at pp. 216-218 [§ 266i does not only apply to attempts to persuade “virtuous” women to enter the profession].)

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