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“section 266i,” not specifically or only of subdivision (a)(2).  Secondly, our defendant did not call out to a streetwalker, as did the defendant in Wagner.  He telephoned a woman, who had placed her first advertisement on the Internet, and talked her into joining his ring.  Despite the posting, Q. had never actually engaged in prostitution before she met defendant.  Later, when she tried to quit, defendant refused to give her any money, denigrated and discouraged her, and persuaded her to come back.  Even if she somehow approached him first by placing the ad, that does not preclude a finding that he pandered.  (Jeffers, supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at p. 855, fn 2.)

Because P. did not testify, there was no direct evidence as to how defendant got her into his ring.  But there was abundant evidence about his depressingly unvaried recruitment methods and how he went about pandering and procuring.  D., Q., and H. all gave similar accounts.  He contacted vulnerable young women inexperienced in prostitution and, with promises of increased income or debt relief, safe working conditions, and the possible purchase of a car, persuaded them, or tried to persuade them, to work for him.  It was not unreasonable for the jury to conclude that he had done the same with P.  Whether P. was formerly a prostitute or ever got any customers through defendant’s efforts was irrelevant.  (Deloach, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at p. 333.)

In 1922, a California court found a defendant who “stood at the door of [the prostitute’s] room and demanded and received the money from the men who entered without handing any of it over to her,” guilty of pimping, in violation of a precursor statute of sections 266h and 266i.  (People v. Navarro (1922) 60 Cal.App. 180, 182.)  

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