how is this possible if the inner realm is private? After all, it might seem, all that we know of others’ actions is their overt, external, publicly accessible outer-realm side. If the connections between inward subjectivity and outward behaviour are merely causal, not conceptual, what guarantees so much as the approximate reliability of the verstehen mode? Why aren’t other people simply thymologically opaque?
4.Wittgenstein, Praxeology, and the Three Realms
Wittgenstein was both deeply indebted to Frege’s work and concerned to transcend its limitations. In my own previous work I’ve discussed some of the ways in which Wittgenstein’s reconfiguration of Frege is useful to the defense and elaboration of Misesian praxeology, with particular application to the problems of normative polylogism and (what I’m here calling) thymological opacity.19 My present concern is not to go over old ground but instead to indicate, first, some of the ways in which Wittgenstein’s aforementioned contributions to praxeology specifically reconfigure and complicate the relations among Frege’s three realms, and second, the implications for praxeology of the ways in which more recent philosophers working in the Wittgensteinian tradition – such as Elizabeth Anscombe, Michael Thompson, and John McDowell – have further extended Wittgenstein’s reconfiguration of the Fregean realms.
Wittgenstein’s solution to the problem of normative polylogism is to argue that nothing counts as genuine thought unless it follows the laws of logic. (Here Wittgenstein follows the strand in Frege that treats logic as the constitutive standard for thinking as such, not the strand that treats it only as a normative
19 Roderick T. Long, “Anti-Psychologism in Economics: Wittgenstein and Mises,” Review of Austrian Economics 17, no. 4 (2004), pp. 345-369; and at greater length, Long, Wittgenstein, Austrian Economics, and the Logic of Action: Praxeological Investigations (Routledge, forthcoming 2009). On related issues see also Long, “Realism and Abstraction,” op. cit.; “Rule-following, Praxeology, and Anarchy,” New Perspectives on Political Economy 2, no. 1 (2006), pp. 36-46; “Praxeology: Who Needs It,” Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 6, no. 2 (Spring 2005), pp. 299–316; “Anscombe for Austrians: Praxeology, War, Democracy, and the State” (unpublished working paper); and “Collingwood: Historicist or Praxeologist,” op. cit. Many of these are available online at <http://praxeology.net/praxeo.htm>.
R. T. Long – Wittgenstein, Praxeology, and Frege’s Three Realms – p. 11