expression as conditions of their identity no less than praxeological ones, the difference being simply that praxeological preferences require expression whenever they exist while “psychological” preferences require only regular expression in the style of logical preponderances. (Once again, one may either reassign these “psychological” preferences to the realm of praxeology, or else say that some aspects of thymology are a priori too.)
5.Anscombe and Entrepreneurship
The late Elizabeth Anscombe (1919-2001), who studied personally with Wittgenstein, extended further his reconfiguration of the three realms in ways that continue to bear importantly on the Misesian praxeological project. In the work of Anscombe’s most relevant to Austrians, her 1957 book Intention, she argues, like Mises, that the means-end structure of action is not an empirical discovery but an a priori constraint on the applicability of action-concepts:
[I]f I say: ‘No, I quite agree, there is no way for a person at the top of the house to get the camera; but still I am going upstairs to get it’ I begin to be unintelligible. In order to make sense of ‘I do P with a view to Q’, we must see how the future state of affairs Q is supposed to be a possible later stage in proceedings of which the action P is an earlier stage.22
Anscombe also develops Wittgenstein’s conceptual linking of the inner and outer realms: the “identification served by colour-names,” for example, “is in fact not primarily that of colours, but of objects by means of colours,” and the “prime mark of colour-discrimination is doing things with objects – fetching them, carrying them, placing them – according to their colours.” Hence “the possession of sensible discrimination and that of volition are inseparable,” which means, not that “every perception must be accompanied by some action,” but only that “one cannot describe a creature as having the power of sensation without also describing it as doing things in accordance with perceived sensible differences.”23
22 G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention, 2nd ed. (Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 36.
23 Ibid.,, p. 68.
R. T. Long – Wittgenstein, Praxeology, and Frege’s Three Realms – p. 16