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Bidding to the Top: Position-based Auctions - page 21 / 23

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General Position-Based Bids

Arbitrary Ranges – Top and bottom cutoffs. For this, GGSP is

Locally stable.

No ordering property.

May not have equilibrium matching the VCG outcome.

What if an advertiser could submit different bids for different positions?

Since no natural ordering of positions left, ordering property doesn’t make sense any more.

Suppose allocation using maximum matching.

Theorem: Maximum matching + local stability VCG.

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