only to clothes changing that occurs ‘at the beginning or end of each workday.’ This implies that such activities are work and that the continuous-work-day clock has already started to run.”); Sandifer v. United States Steel Corp., 2009 WL 3430222 at *40 (N.D. Ind.) (“The court can’t conclude as a matter of law that the non-compensability . . . under [§ 203(o)] excludes consideration of whether, pursuant to [the Portal Act], those activities are an integral and indispensable part of the employees’ principal activities . . . .”); Andrako v. United States Steel Corp., 632 F. Supp. 2d 398, 412-413 (W.D. Pa. 2009) (“Section 203(o) relates to the compensability of time spent donning, doffing and washing in the collective-bargaining process. It does not render such time any more or less integral or indispensable to an employee’s job.”); Johnson v. Koch Foods Inc., 2009 WL 3817447, * 32 (E.D. Tenn.) (“[I]f the donning, doffing, and washing excluded by 203(o) are determined by the trier of fact to be integral and indispensable, those activities could commence the workday.”); Gatewood v. Koch Foods of Mississippi, LLC, 569 F. Supp. 2d 687, 702 (S.D. Miss. 2008) (“Although the statute precludes recovery for time spent washing and ‘changing clothes,’ it does not affect the fact that these activities could be the first ‘integral and indispensable’ act that triggers the start of the continuous workday rule for subsequent activities . . .”).
Consistent with the weight of authority, it is the Administrator’s interpretation that clothes changing covered by § 203(o) may be a principal activity. Where that is the case, subsequent activities, including walking and waiting, are compensable. The Administrator issues this interpretation to assist employees and employers in all industries to better understand the scope of the § 203(o) exemption.