et seq., Fla. Stat. (2000). Therefore the rules governing the destruction of a debtor’s
interest in property differ depending on whether the creditor’s security is borne by the
title, as in Burnsed, or by the vehicle itself, as in the instant case. The title loan statute
affords the debtor considerably less protection than the UCC. See Burnsed, 224 B.R. at
499. The Burnsed holding is limited to situations where the title to a vehicle is pledged.
The instant case is not governed by Burnsed or by Chapter 538, but by Florida’s
enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code and by the Florida motor vehicle title
Florida Statutes § 679.504 and § 679.505 support the proposition that a debtor in
bankruptcy, and thus the debtor’s bankruptcy estate, maintains legal title to the vehicle
even if a creditor repossesses the vehicle prepetition. See In re Iferd, 225 B.R. at 503
(Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1998). The Iferd court refused to follow the rule of In re Lewis, 137
F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 1998) on the ground that Lewis was decided under Alabama law.
See Id. at 503; see also In re Littleton, 220 B.R. 710, 714 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1998)
(rejecting the rule of Lewis in Georgia on identical grounds). The Iferd court found that
Florida law on title after repossession is governed by the UCC, while Alabama law is
guided by the common law of conversion. See Id. The Iferd court found that the UCC,
and thus Florida law, preserves legal title in a debtor’s bankruptcy estate despite a
prepetition repossession. See Id.
Additionally, Florida’s motor vehicle title statute, § 319.22, provides that title to a
repossessed car remains in the debtor until the vehicle is sold and a new certificate of title
is issued. See In re Chiodo, 250 B.R. 407, 409 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2000). The Chiodo