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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT - page 22 / 29

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(Servantes, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 1090; see also Berry v. Hannigan, supra, 7 Cal.App.4th at p. 591 [declining to distinguish towing services from other service providers because the towing services "are not sought, or consented to, by the vehicle owner" and noting such owner "is in no position to decline the tower's services, or select another tower, or negotiate the manner or amount of payment"].)  The regulations overall set out protections for vehicle owners who have had their vehicle moved without their consent or authorization.  Like the court in Independent Towers, we have little doubt the storage fee regulation that is a part of this scheme relates to nonconsensual tows.  

Defendant urges us to reject application of the nonconsensual towing exception on the ground the exception is narrowly drafted; it argues the exception, unlike the FAAAA's general preemption provision, does not refer to "routes" or "services," and thus it is limited to just the price charged for actual transportation of the vehicle.  Relying on R. Meyer of Atlanta, Inc. v. City of Atlanta (11th Cir. 1998) 158 F.3d. 538 (Meyer) (abrogated in part by City of Columbus, supra, 536 U.S. 424), he maintains Congress intended the exception to be limited to permitting state and local governments to set a maximum price for nonconsensual tows only, not any other aspect of tow truck operations such as storage.  He further argues the trial court correctly concluded that inclusion of the word "storage" in 49 U.S.C. section 13102(21)(B) refers only to that storage occurring during the actual movement of the vehicle, i.e., while the vehicle is on the tow truck during transport.  

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