We reject these contentions. At issue in Meyer was whether the FAAAA expressly preempted municipal ordinances regulating the provision of consensual towing services. (Meyer, supra, 158 F.3d at pp. 540, 542.) It was in that context that the court set out legislative history showing Congress intended to preempt state or local ordinances regulating the provision of consensual intrastate towing services, in view of the express exception including only regulations addressing the prices of nonconsensual towing. (Id. at. p. 544.) Citing to a House Report accompanying the proposed version of the nonconsensual towing exception, the Meyer court said: "Congress thus limited the exception to include only those regulations that address the prices of nonconsensual towing, while leaving undisturbed the preemptive effect of the statute as it pertains to all other aspects of the towing industry. As noted prior to the amendment's passage, '[t]he pending legislation would restore the local authority to engage in regulating the prices charged by tow trucks in non-consensual towing situations. Regulation of routes and services, as well as regulation of consensual towing, would still be preempted.' " (Meyer, 158 F.3d at p. 544.) The Meyer court did not address the definition of "transportation" contained in 49 U.S.C. section 13102(21)(B), or the scope of the exception as it may or may not relate to storage of vehicles. Meyer is not persuasive authority on the question presented on this appeal.
Nor are we willing to conclude that the reference to "storage" in 49 U.S.C. section 13102(21)(B)'s definition of transportation is limited to storage while a vehicle is in transit upon a tow truck. The definition is broad and open-ended – providing