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and every creditor has standing to challenge a debtor’s right to discharge under §727(c) and to seek

a determination that a particular debt is not dischargeable under §523. Ferraro v. Philips (In re

Philips), 185 B.R. 121, 128 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y 1995). Moreover, bankruptcy courts have consistently

interpreted the term “creditor” broadly in keeping with the legislative history, including individuals

or entities claiming the right to payment on a prepetition debt even if such debt is disputed,

contingent or unliquidated. Id. at 128; Justus v. Justus, 581 N.E.2d at 1270 (“Congress intended for

the term ‘claim’ to be given the ‘broadest possible definition’”). A contingent contribution claim

arises at the time a creditor co-signs a note with a debtor, rather than when that creditor makes

payments on that note. Psychotherapy & Counseling Center, Inc. v. Shalala (In re Psychotherapy

& Counseling Center, Inc.), 195 B.R. 536, 542 (Bankr. D.C. 1996)(Under District of Columbia Law

a claim for contribution among parties to a common debt arises when the two parties become jointly

liable to a third party and enforceable only after the one seeking it has been forced to pay).

Dr. Thompson’s position is that Kentor cannot be a creditor as he has no claim. Dr.

Thompson argues Kentor’s right to contribution has not arisen because he has not paid the Meredith

Loan in full as required under Texas law, Caldwell v. Stevenson, 567 S.W.2d 278, 280 (Tex. Civ.

App.–Austin 1978, no writ); see also Dittberner v. Bell, 558 S.W.2d 527, 534 (Tex. Civ.

App.–Amarillo 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.)(“While each signer of a note is liable to the payee for the

entire amount, generally, as between two signers, each is liable for one-half of the

amount.”)(citations omitted); and because he cannot collect against an insolvent debtor. Maresh v.

Jennings, 38 S.W. 2d 406 (Tex. Civ. App.–Austin 1931, writ ref’d); Twichell v. Askew, 141 S.W.

1072 (Texas Civ. App.–Amarillo 1911, no writ). Additionally, she argues that Kentor’s contribution

claim is disallowable under §502(e)(1)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code. Accordingly, he should not be

granted standing to pursue a discharge action.


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