claims that could have supported denial of discharge filing were barred by res judicata); See also
Vahlsing, 829 F2d 565, 567 (5th Cir. 1987)(Pre-petition creditor who had claim adjudicated and
dismissed in state court lost creditor status); But see, Horizon Financial F.A. v. Gresham (In re
Gresham), 95 B.R. 836 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1988)(reaching merits of debtor’s objection to creditor’s
claim and finding creditor lacked standing).
Kentor’s claim, however, is not barred by res judicata or the statute of limitations, and the
divorce court did not resolve the contribution claim in connection with the Meredith Loan. The
Horizon court is in the minority with respect to determining the merits of the claim prior to the issue
allowance/disallowance of Kentor’s contribution claim. Further, the majority of the court’s
addressing this issue have determined that any such adjudication should not affect the issue of
standing. This Court agrees.
Kentor is a “creditor” of Dr. Thompson because he had a contingent claim for contribution
on the petition date against Dr. Thompson. He was liable and could be called upon in the future to
pay the same. The Divorce Decree did nothing to alter the parties’ positions. The question of this
claim’s enforceability against the bankruptcy estate arose after the filing of the bankruptcy case and
not before. Further, we cannot predict the future. If Kentor is successful in this case and Dr.
Thompson does not receive a discharge, he may then be called upon to pay the Meredith Loan in full
and have a right to contribution which would be enforceable presuming the good doctor is then
solvent. Chalk v. Collier, 208 S.W. 972 (Tex. Civ. App.–Amarillo 1919 writ ref’d)(The insolvent
remains liable to those paying and may be compelled to pay them if he or she becomes able). Who
knows. Crazier things have happened. But, the point is that Kentor held that contingent claim on
the petition date. And that is enough for standing. Whether it will ever be non-contingent or