Thompson’s discharge. However, it is clear that such purchase was for an improper purpose.
Harassment borne out of marital acrimony and divorce is not a proper purpose. “The right to object
to a debtor’s discharge is not a marketable commodity which may be purchased by one party from
another in order to inflict further punishment and discomfort upon the debtor.” Young v. Beugen (In
re Beugen), 99 B.R.961 at 965 (BAP 9th Cir. 1989).
Kentor filed this adversary proceeding in
March of 2005. He did not purchase the Pool & Spa claim of $598.00 until November 21, 2005
eight (8) months after the adversary filing and nineteen (19) days after Dr. Thompson filed her
Motion for Summary Judgment objecting to his standing. Pool & Spa Services did not file a proof
of claim in this bankruptcy proceeding and, therefore, Kentor cannot share in any distributions that
may be available. It is obvious that Kentor purchased the claim for the sole purpose of attempting
to validate his standing in order to pursue this action and presumably extract his “pound of flesh”
for whatever injuries, real or imagined, he feels were inflicted upon him during his marriage to Dr.
Thompson. The Court will not allow Kentor to manipulate the court system this way.
Kentor’s stronger standing argument is the fact that he has co-signer status on the Meredith
Loan. The Divorce Decree did not alter or affect either parties’ liability under the note. The
uncontested summary judgment evidence establishes that Kentor and Dr. Thompson are jointly and
severally liable on the Meredith Loan. Mr. Meredith is the holder of an allowed unsecured claim,
and Dr. Thompson has acknowledged that debt in her schedules. Because Kentor had a contingent
right of contribution against Dr. Thompson at the time of filing, those rights are sufficient to
establish his “claim”under the Bankruptcy Code and sufficient to provide “standing” for his
challenge to Dr. Thompson’s discharge under §727.
Section 727(c)(1) provides that “the trustee, a creditor, or the United States Trustee may
object to the granting of a discharge” under Section 727(a). 11 U.S.C. §727(c)(1)(West 2006). Any