continues to reside.
The essence of Shurman's appeal
is that his "usual place of
abode" for service of process purpose
s was not where he had
voluntarily lived with his family bef
ore going to jail, but was
instead the prison where he resided a
rejecting this construction of the te
rm "place of abode," the
Fifth District cited with approval th
e trial court's reliance on
Bull v. Kistner, 135 N.W.2d 545 (Iowa
1965) quoted in Araujo v.
Ramirez-Limon, 490 So.2d 1049, 1049 (
Faced with identical facts to this ca
se, the Kistner court
construed the meaning of "usual place
of abode" to mean
"domicile" and observed that:
where one abode or occupying otherwise
voluntarily establishes a place of residence but is prevented from it, by acts of sovereign or , his place of abode is not changed.
Id. at 54 Ill. 1947 prevents court rea place of
(quoting Bohland v. Smith
Because prison is a pl defendant from occupyin
the family home Id. at 548.
, 7 F.D.R. 364, 365 (E.D. ace of punishment which g his chosen residence, the ins the defendant's usual
1 Dept. 1994).
that if a
to be occ
upied by other
When service o "the Kist N.Y.S.2d
adopting that reasoning an f process in this case, the ner rationale was followed 401, 403 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 199
d approving Atlantic's
Fifth District noted that in Montes v. Seda, 599 3), aff'd, 626 N.Y.S. 2d 61
There, the court held
In Araujo, service was invalidated when made on an incarcerated
defendant by serving a family member at a new house to which the
family had moved after the imprisonment and where
incarcerated defendant had never resided. cited Bull v. Kistner in comparison.