review board shall be conclusive and binding as to all questions of fact.” I.C. § 22-4-17-
12(a). We do not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses. McHugh,
842 N.E.2d at 440. Regarding the Board’s conclusions of law, we assess whether the
Board correctly interpreted and applied the law. Id. Questions of statutory interpretation
are questions of law reserved for the courts. GPI at Danville Crossing, L.P. v. West Cent.
Conservancy Dist., 867 N.E.2d 645, 653 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
The Board here adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the ALJ.
Whiteside does not dispute the findings of fact by the ALJ. Rather, Whiteside contends
the Board misapplied the law in its reliance on Indiana Code Section 22-4-15-1(a). That
subsection sets out grounds for disqualification for unemployment benefits and provides
that “an individual who has voluntarily left the individual’s most recent employment
without good cause in connection with the work” is ineligible. I.C. § 22-4-15-1(a). This
statute requires that the employee’s reason for terminating cannot be purely subjective or
personal. Kentucky Truck Sale, Inc. v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 725
N.E.2d 523, 525 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). There is no question that Whiteside voluntary left
her employment for a cause unrelated to her work and personal to her. She left on her
own accord to take care of her son, an admirable decision, yet we conclude the ALJ and
the Review Board were correct in their findings of fact and application of the law to deny
unemployment benefits to Whiteside pursuant to Indiana Code Section 22-4-15-1(a).
Whiteside contends that one of the exclusions for physical disability in the statute
should have been applied to her to allow receipt of benefits. That section provides: “An
individual whose unemployment is the result of medically substantiated physical 4