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review board shall be conclusive and binding as to all questions of fact.” I.C. § 22-4-17-

12(a). We do not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses. McHugh,

842 N.E.2d at 440. Regarding the Board’s conclusions of law, we assess whether the

Board correctly interpreted and applied the law. Id. Questions of statutory interpretation

are questions of law reserved for the courts. GPI at Danville Crossing, L.P. v. West Cent.

Conservancy Dist., 867 N.E.2d 645, 653 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).

The Board here adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the ALJ.

Whiteside does not dispute the findings of fact by the ALJ. Rather, Whiteside contends

the Board misapplied the law in its reliance on Indiana Code Section 22-4-15-1(a). That

subsection sets out grounds for disqualification for unemployment benefits and provides

that “an individual who has voluntarily left the individual’s most recent employment

without good cause in connection with the work” is ineligible. I.C. § 22-4-15-1(a). This

statute requires that the employee’s reason for terminating cannot be purely subjective or

personal. Kentucky Truck Sale, Inc. v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 725

N.E.2d 523, 525 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). There is no question that Whiteside voluntary left

her employment for a cause unrelated to her work and personal to her. She left on her

own accord to take care of her son, an admirable decision, yet we conclude the ALJ and

the Review Board were correct in their findings of fact and application of the law to deny

unemployment benefits to Whiteside pursuant to Indiana Code Section 22-4-15-1(a).

Whiteside contends that one of the exclusions for physical disability in the statute

should have been applied to her to allow receipt of benefits. That section provides: “An

individual whose unemployment is the result of medically substantiated physical 4

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