has plead with particularity the “circumstances” of the alleged fraud “in order to place defendants
on notice of the precise misconduct with which they are charged, and to safeguard against spurious
charges of immoral and fraudulent behavior.” Seville Indus. Mach. Corp. v. Southmost Mach.
Corp., 742 F.2d 786, 791 (3d Cir. 1984); see also Banks v. Wolk, 918 F.2d 418, 422 n.1 (3d Cir.
1990) (finding that blanket allegations of mail and wire fraud without information of who made or
received the fraudulent representations are insufficient to satisfy 9(b)); Lum v. Bank of America, 361
F.3d 217, 223-24 (3d Cir. 2004) (requiring some means of precision when pleading fraudulent
circumstances, such as date, place, or time of fraud).
Construing the Amended Complaint in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs, and assuming all
facts in the Amended Complaint to be true, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have provided sufficient
facts to establish all elements of a valid RICO claim.
I. The Association-in-Fact Enterprise and the Distinctiveness Requirements.
In the Motion to Dismiss, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have failed to state a RICO claim
because Plaintiffs did not plead a valid “association-in-fact” enterprise. (Def. Mot. to Dismiss, 22).
Defendant’s chief argument is that the Amended Complaint does not satisfy the “distinctiveness”
requirement of RICO as explained in copious federal case law. To satisfy the “distinctiveness”
requirement under § 1962(c), Plaintiffs must allege that the RICO “enterprise” is distinct from the
Defendant “person” alleged to have violated RICO and that the “enterprise” is distinct from the
alleged pattern of racketeering activity. For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that Plaintiffs
have satisfied the “distinctiveness” requirements and have alleged a valid “association-in-fact”