The case before the Court “is not a situation where the enterprise cannot be either formally
or practically separable from the person.” Living Designs, 431 F.3d at 362. The minimum amount
of “separateness” between a “person” and “enterprise” required for a RICO violation was described
in Cedric Kushner, supra at 163. In that case, the Court confronted the question of whether there are
technically two entities (a “person” and an “enterprise”) where the person (Don King) is the
president, employee and sole shareholder of a closely held corporation (Don King Productions) and
the alleged enterprise is the corporation itself. Id. at 160. The Court held that Don King as corporate
owner/employee was distinct from the Don King Productions corporation. Id. at 163. In so finding,
the Court explained that RICO simply requires a formal legal distinction between the “person” and
“enterprise.” Id. at 165. See also McCullough v. Suter, 757 F.2d 142, 144 (7th Cir. 1985)
(concluding that all that is required to satisfy the distinctiveness requirement is that the enterprise
be formally or practically separable from the individual).
Here, Plaintiffs have satisfied the minimum “person” and “enterprise” distinctiveness
requirement because the combination of Commonwealth Land and the title agents constitute a single
“enterprise” separate and distinct from the “person” of Defendant Commonwealth Land and this
combination is permissible under RICO jurisprudence.
b. Plaintiffs Sufficiently Allege an Organized “Enterprise” Structure.
To plead an “association-in-fact” RICO enterprise, Plaintiffs must show: (i) that there exists
an ongoing organization, formal or informal; (ii) that the various associates of the organization
function as a continuing unit; and (iii) that the organization has an existence separate and apart from
the alleged pattern of racketeering activity. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981).