III. Plaintiffs’ Claim is Not Pre-empted by the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
Defendant asserts that even if Plaintiffs state a viable RICO claim, the claim is pre-empted
by the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (2009). The Act provides that “no Act of
Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supercede any law enacted by any State for the
purpose of regulating the business of insurance.” § 1012(b). This preclusion is applied when, inter
alia, “application of the federal statute would invalidate, impair, or supersede [relevant state laws].”
Sabo v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 137 F.3d 185, 190-91 (3d Cir. 1998). As noted, supra, Defendant
argued that applying federal law in this case would directly interfere with TICA § 910-44(b), a state
insurance law which purportedly provides an exclusive administrative remedy when a party is
overcharged for title insurance. (Def. Mot. to Dismiss, 23.)
As discussed above in Section IV, A, in light of the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s White
decision, the current TICA landscape is clear: § 910-44(b) does not create an exclusive
administrative remedy which would preclude Plaintiffs from filing this private right of action in
court. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint presents no conflict with state law that is pre-
empted by the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
C. Plaintiffs Assert a Viable Claim under UTPCPL.
Plaintiffs assert a claim under the UTPCPL, 73 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 201-1, et seq. (2008), for
fraudulent or deceptive conduct in connection with the title insurance transaction. (Pl. Am. Compl.
¶¶77-78.) The general purpose of this consumer protection law is to protect the public from fraud
and unfair or deceptive business practices. Neal v. Bavarian Motors, Inc., 882 A.2d 1022, 1029 (Pa.
Super. 2005). The UTPCPL “is to be construed liberally to effect its object of preventing unfair or