finally, while we might say that certain things should not be expected of persons, even for the sake of promoting the greater overall good, inasmuch as they are ends-in-themselves, so also certain things should not ever be done to them, even for the sake of promoting the greater overall good. This is just to say that persons are inviolable.
Thus far, I have suggested that a contract approach will adequately ground a moderate morality if we understand the bargainers’ motivations, not as they are portrayed according to traditional contractarian accounts, but rather as twofold: as being concerned both with natural and moral goods. The remainder of this thesis will be devoted to explaining exactly how this twofold motivation leads to the constraints and options required for a successful reply to Kagan’s challenge to moderate morality. Before we go on to do this, though, we should note that the two aspects of my bargainers’ motivation do not amount to the same thing. To say that the bargainers are motivated to promote self-interest is not merely another way of saying they desire to formulate a set of rules that gives proper expression to their moral status as persons. Instead, these two motivations are quite distinct, and may at times even be in tension with each other. For instance, as we shall soon see, there may be some actions that are perfectly compatible with restrictions on behavior that would arise from the first motive alone, but that are incompatible with the bargainers’ second motive. What this means is that in our effort to ground constraints, their principled exceptions, and options all in the common source of our bargainers’ desires, we must take extra care that the constraints, exceptions and options we formulate be such that they adequately fit both dimensions of their twofold motivation.