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their twofold motivation. Let us go on to consider the shape of the modified restrictions that arise out of our bargainers’ second, personhood-respecting motive. II. The personhood-respecting motive and restrictions on the pursuit of individual good

My bargainers’ second motivation will of course also lead them to adopt some sorts of restrictions. At first glance, these restrictions will have pretty much the same shape as the restrictions that emerge from the self-interest-maximizing motive. And the reason for this should be fairly clear: lying to, stealing from, and harming other persons pretty obviously constitutes disrespecting them and disregarding the moral status they bear insofar as they are persons. Any moral system that will give proper expression to this status, then, must surely prohibit such behavior. Upon a closer examination, though, we will see that the restrictions arising out of the bargainers’ second motive have additional features that are not shared with the simple restrictions that emerge from the bargainers’ first motive. For the restrictions that result from the bargainers’ second motive will not merely be rules adopted because they are expedient in promoting everyone’s greater self- interest. Instead, these restrictions will be adopted in order to give expression to the moral status of persons. As such, they will confer rights upon all parties to the contract. Assigning rights to the members of the moral community is not simply a matter of expediency. It is a matter of determining what may or may not be done to or required of a person, regardless of the promotion of overall self-interest that could thereby be enacted. While the assigning and honoring of rights more often than not is expedient in bringing about everybody’s greater self-interest, a system of morality that features genuine constraints and rights demands that these constraints and rights be honored, even on those relatively few occasions when not honoring them would be more expedient. So the bargainers’ personhood-respecting motive leads not simply to restrictions on harming, lying, stealing, and so forth, but to genuine deontological constraints against these things. On their face, these constraints bear much the same shape as the mere restrictions that the bargainers’ arrived at out of their first motive; the distinctive features of genuinely deontological constraints will become clear, though, when we consider the extent to which these constraints are defeasible – that is, the extent to which they will admit of principled exceptions. In what follows, I will examine the way in which the bargainers’ particular motive to formulate a set of rules that recognizes and preserves persons’


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