principles will do the trick here. For on such a view, the inviolability of persons is not a natural good to be promoted within a moral system, but a moral good to be recognized by the system. B. Morality's 'giving proper expression to' the inviolable status of persons: genuinely deontological constraints.
By arguing that persons are primarily bearers of the first type of status, Kamm, Quinn, Nagel, and my bargainers are insisting that a certain inviolability accompanies personhood. Such inviolability rules out the possibility that persons' lives might be sacrificed for the greater good for any reason -- even if that reason is the reduction of similar violations to other persons -- and therefore calls for the erection of genuinely deontological constraints for the sake of recognizing this inviolability. Thus, while the 'person as recipient of goods' conceptions fits in best with consequentialism (indeed, we might even say that each one implies the other), the 'person as inviolable' conception fits in best with non-consequentialism. In fact, the inviolable status of persons – though it is still compatible with thresholds26 – is uncompromising in its demand for genuine deontological constraints against, say, harming others.
The bargainers, then, will be motivated to adopt a moral system that reflects their inviolable status -- they will adopt a system of deontological constraints. Notice that this status is the sort of thing that must be reflected by the rules of morality -- it is not something that should or even can be 'brought about' (or 'promoted', or 'maximized') by the ethical system. In fact, it is the very essence of a properly ‘deontological’ constraint that it be non-teleological. It is a matter of what can or may (justifiably) happen to a person, not what actually does happen to him. Furthermore, the erection of these constraints results in the parties to the contract being endowed with certain rights. These points have been stressed heavily in the recent discussion of this topic. Warren Quinn states that,
The value that lies at the heart of my argument -- the appropriateness of morality's recognizing us as independent beings -- is in the first instance a virtue of the moral design itself. The fittingness of this recognition is not a goal of action, and therefore not something that we could be tempted to serve by
26 ‘Thresholds’ are points above which the evil that would result from adhering to a constraint might be so great as to override the constraint. They will be discussed in more detail in section III-E below.