ing that not only is it an evil for a person to be harmed in certain ways, but for it to be permissible to harm the person in those ways is an additional and independent evil. 32
As this applies to our contractarian view, we might say, “Natural goods are not the only concern of a set of rational bargainers; they will be concerned with moral goods as well.”
Frances Kamm perhaps puts the point against the consequentialist best of all, when she asks,
Would it not express greater concern for this concep- tion of the person [as an inviolable end-in-itself] if we mini- mized the number of occasions on which people were not per- mitted to choose, even if this meant occasionally depriving someone of choice by obliging him to make a big sacrifice that ensured that others might choose? My view is that permitting this means to minimization . . . would defeat the very ideal of the person as an end-in-itself that was supposedly the object of concern. For if such an obligation were appropriate, the indivi- dual would no longer be someone who was not 'for' the greater good, as he would be available for minimizing interference with the value of choice. 33
C. The trade-off
But Kamm also takes note of another almost 'paradoxical' element of the right/constraint structure of such morality, similar to the paradoxical element that Nagel wrote about. This involves the trade-off required, which both Kamm and Nagel discuss: we may foresee that there actually may be more rights- or personhood-violations (more killings, stealings, etc.) in this system that supposedly gives such a high premium to constraints against violating persons, than we would in certain consequentialist systems that sanctioned any means necessary to the minimization of such violations. However, as Kamm points out, by adopting such a morality, we are not actually sanctioning these violations, even as we foresee that they may occur. She writes:
If morality permitted minimizing violations of persons by violating other persons, then each of those saved as well as those persons used to save others would be less inviolable. It is the permission, not any actual violation of persons, that makes this so. If more violations of constraints actually occur because violations are not permitted, this does not mean that morality endorses the correctness of these harmings. More
Kamm 1992, 359.